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In January 2012, the European Commission presented the
draft of a new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
to the European Parliament and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union. The GDPR is planned to replace the 1995
Directive 95/46/EC, which constitutes the present Euro-
pean legal framework for processing of personal data.
Hence, this new binding Regulation will lay the legal
foundation for future European epidemiology based on
personal data, including register-based research.
The intentions behind the new GDPR are commendable:
[1] to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
individuals, in particular their right to protection of per-
sonal data, in a society where commercial enterprises and
authorities have rapidly increasing capabilities to collect,
store and combine personal information; and [2] to facili-
tate free movement of personal data within the European
Union through a uniform legislation in all member states.
The Commission’s proposal is being reviewed and
amended independently by the Council of the European
Union and the European Parliament. In the Parliament, the
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
(LIBE) was assigned the task of formulating the Parlia-
ment’s amendments. The first draft by the chairman of the
Committee, Jan Philipp Albrecht, was criticized for insuf-
ficient consideration to the needs of epidemiological
research. The proposed text threatened to restrict currently
existing possibilities to produce scientific evidence based
on European data analysis and, in turn, to impede efforts to
improve public health and welfare in the union and
elsewhere.
In October 2013, after a long period of negotiations
surrounded by intense lobbying efforts, the LIBE Com-
mittee voted on its final amendments to the Commission’s
proposal [1]. Alas, although some improvements were
noted, the overall outcome was largely disappointing from
an epidemiological perspective. The main points are sum-
marized in the following.
The first Articles with specific relevance for scientific
research are concerned with general principles (Article 5)
and lawfulness (Article 6) of personal data processing.
Article 5b lays down that personal data shall be collected
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and may not
be further processed in a way incompatible with those
purposes (‘‘purpose limitation’’). This corresponds to an
identical principle in the current 95/46/EC Directive.
However, in Directive 95/46/EC there was an exemption
for research, namely that further processing of data for
historical, statistical or scientific purposes is not to be
considered as incompatible with the original purpose as
long as Member States provide appropriate safeguards.
This exemption was omitted in LIBE’s amendments, dra-
matically reducing the scope for data sharing between
research groups and severely restraining the use of retro-
spective (historic) cohort study designs. Such studies uti-
lize old data collections with exposure information that was
collected for other purposes than the current scientific
research. Thus, hundreds of thousands person-years of
follow-up may have accumulated already at the start of the
retrospective cohort study, making it possible to immedi-
ately test important public health hypotheses that would
otherwise take decades to address. A typical example is the
study of long-term health effects of Swedish snus (snuff) in
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an already existing cohort of construction workers [2]. If
taken literally, the omission of the exemption threatens to
eliminate the possibility to use administrative registers for
epidemiological research altogether.
Articles 6.2 and 83: shaky pillars forming the legal
foundation
Article 6 establishes the necessary prerequisites for any
lawful processing of personal data. In its second paragraph
(6.2) it lays down that processing ‘‘which is necessary for
the purposes of historical, statistical or scientific research’’
is lawful as long as the processing adheres to the provisions
given in Article 83. Article 83, however, is remarkably
meagre; all it says is that processing of personal data for the
purposes of historical, statistical or scientific research is
allowed only if these purposes cannot be otherwise fulfilled
using anonymous data and that ‘‘data enabling the attri-
bution of information to an identified or identifiable data
subject is kept separately from the other information under
the highest technical standards, and all necessary measures
are taken to prevent unwarranted re-identification of the
data subjects’’ (i.e., pseudonymisation is mandatory). Of
note, Article 83 does not mention informed consent among
its conditions.
Another paragraph (6.1) in Article 6 states that pro-
cessing shall be lawful only if at least one of six specified
conditions (a-f) is met. Consent is one such condition,
whereas scientific research is not. Our interpretation is that
6.2 overrides 6.1 and that Article 6 approves processing of
personal data for scientific research purposes, even in the
absence of consent. However, Article 6 might be inter-
preted differently by others. If so, obligatory consent will
be required for all research using personal data, including
epidemiological research.
A general problem with the Article 6.2–83 axis is that
while it implies that the relevant conditions in the two
Articles will fully determine the scope for the processing of
personal data for historical, statistical or scientific research
purposes, derogations for research appears in Articles 5e,
9.2i, 17.3c, and 81.2. These scattered single derogations
imply that all other parts of the Regulation are meant to be
applicable to scientific research. This generates confusion
and may create unintended impediments for research.
An amendment to Article 81 is a serious threat to large-
scale epidemiological research
Article 9.2i lays down that processing of sensitive personal
data, including data concerning health, is allowed when
necessary for historical, statistical and scientific research
purposes subject to the conditions referred to in Article 83.
However, a very unfortunate amendment by LIBE to
Article 81, dealing with processing of data concerning
health, notably for the due operation of health care ser-
vices, has materially disturbed the original apparent sym-
metry between Articles 6, 9, 81, and 83. The revised
Article 81.2 says that ‘‘processing of personal data con-
cerning health which is necessary for historical, statistical
or scientific research purposes shall be permitted only with
the consent of the data subject, and shall be subject to the
conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 83’’. The
additional stipulation of mandatory informed consent
makes the cross-reference between 6.2 and 83 somewhat
misleading.
Admittedly, an accompanying amendment (81.2a) and
Recitals 123 and 123a open for the possibility that Member
States law may provide for exceptions to the requirement
of consent, with regard to research that serves a high public
interest. Then, in addition to obligatory pseudonymisation
and with reference to Article 19, the data subjects are
explicitly given the right to object at any time. That Article
19 only concerns processing based on points (d) and (e) of
Article 6.1, not on processing for scientific research pur-
poses according to Article 6.2, further emphasizes the
anomalous character of Article 81.2a. What constitutes
‘‘high public interest’’ is to be determined by the Com-
mission via delegated acts, after consultations with the
European Data Protection Board. This is indeed an
important encroachment on the subsidiarity principle of the
European Union.
The legal practice following from these provisions—if
enacted without further changes—remains conjectural, but
a restrictive interpretation may have devastating effects on
large-scale epidemiological research where collection of
informed consent is unfeasible, or where non-participation
threaten to bias the results. Such studies constitute a sig-
nificant part of the combined European epidemiological
literature; one example of the former is the Swedish-Dan-
ish SCANDAT blood donation and transfusion database
covering donations, transfusions, and long-term health
outcomes among 1.1 million donors and 1.3 million
recipients as far back as 1966 [3]. With approvals from the
ethics boards, the data were derived from computerised
administrative blood bank databases and high-quality
health registers, allowing precise estimations of disease
concordance among donors and recipients indicative of
possible transmission of diseases such as cancer, Alzhei-
mer’s and Parkinson’s diseases [4]. Another excellent
example of a study sensitive to bias caused by refusal or
inability to obtain informed consent is a British study
measuring the cancer risk among almost 180,000 persons
who underwent CT scans in childhood, in order to develop
guidelines for safe use of CT scans in clinical practice [5].
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An additional drawback of the reliance on Member State
law for exemption from the obligatory consent will be that
the intended uniformity of research-related legislation
throughout Europe will not be attained, maintaining
existing obstacles for free movement of research data
across European borders.
Uncertainties about the future of health registers
The status of the high-quality health registers—epidemio-
logical crown jewels for public health statistics and public
health policy in several European countries and essentially
indispensable resources in health research by virtue of their
completeness and virtual absence of bias—might become a
cliffhanger. The registers will first stumble on the previ-
ously mentioned LIBE amendment requiring consent
(Article 81.2), and then remain at the mercy of national
legislation, which may or may not waive the obligatory
consent but cannot remove the obligatory pseudonymisa-
tion or the right for the data subjects to object. Moreover,
even if national laws will support the collection of personal
data on health without consent of the data subjects, the
release of health register data for research conducted by
other researchers may require consent.
Mandatory pseudonymisation: not a trivial issue
Obligatory pseudonymisation (data enabling identification
of specific data subjects being kept separately from the
other information) might be seen as a small and reasonable
concession, but if strictly interpreted the consequences for
epidemiological research may be detrimental. In the pres-
ent LIBE amendment, personal data is defined as data that
contains a unique personal identifier (direct identification)
or data that can be attributed to a person without the pre-
sence of an identifier because of the richness of the avail-
able information. The combination of a few key variables
(e.g., age, sex, date of diagnosis, geographic region, and
diagnosis code) in a contingency table often results in some
cells with just a single observation, providing a possibility
for indirect identification of at least some subjects. If
indirect identification is to be counted as ‘‘data enabling
attribution of information to a data subject’’, then research
databases must be stripped of considerable amounts of
information in order to adhere to the requirement of
pseudonymisation, possibly rendering many—if not most
of them—useless for epidemiological research.
In addition, as convincingly argued previously [6]
pseudonymisation is likely to be influenced by trivial errors
in the data used in the pseudonymisation process. This will
increase the risk of missed linkages of data on single
individuals. Even if these error rates are small, a simulation
has indicated that the effect on aggregated measures such
as e.g. survival may be far from trivial. Therefore, strict
adherence to the pseudonymisation rule will likely result in
a general loss of quality of data in existing health registers.
There are no explicit provisions regarding the lawfulness
of, or procedures for, warranted re-identification for the
purpose of e.g. record linkages, quality control of data, or
verification of conducted research. The mere acknowl-
edgement of the existence of a key file, and the retained
exemptions for research data from the data storage mini-
mization rule (no longer than necessary for the purpose) in
Article 5e and from the data subject’s right to erasure of
data in Article 17.3c and Recital 53, however, lead us to
believe that re-identification, when necessary, will be
lawful. It would be helpful if Article 83 would explicitly
state that the pseudonymisation requirement can be law-
fully waived during checking or matching operations and
also acknowledge that processing of identifiable personal
data is sometimes necessary for sustaining the highest
quality in epidemiological research.
What next?
While the aim was to complete this legislative process
before the Parliament election in May 2014, it has now
become apparent to all parties that the goal will not be
attained. In order to avoid having to start from scratch
again after the election, the Parliament endorsed LIBE’s
amendments to the Regulation with 621 votes in favour, 10
against and 22 abstentions in a plenary voting on March 12,
2014. Although this strong support underscores the gravity
of the situation for European epidemiology and register-
based research, the battle is not yet lost. The Council of the
European Union—the other part of the essentially bicam-
eral EU legislature—needs to agree on a position. In order
for the legislation to become a reality, the wordings of the
Parliament and the Council texts have to agree exactly. The
current aim of The Working Party on Information
Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX), which handles the
review of the Regulation in the Council, is to present a
draft to the Minister meeting in June 2014, but more
realistically DAPIX needs another 3–6 months to finish its
work. Thereafter, a ‘‘second reading’’ process will ensue, in
which the Council and the Parliament negotiate a final
draft. Thus, there are still opportunities to ensure that the
Council adopts a more research-friendly position which
averts the imminent threats to large-scale epidemiologic
studies and register-based research in general. It must be
acknowledged that the view on integrity issues differs
between European Member States, based on historical
experiences and long-term tradition. Moreover, while there
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is a broad consensus that the protection of individuals’
personal data should be strengthened when technical
developments open endless opportunities to collect and
combine such information, the willingness to put trust in
the scientific community and entrust scientists with
exemptions varies. The LIBE amendment represents a
hardline stand with only few concessions specifically for
research, adapted to Member States with the least favour-
able conditions for large-scale epidemiology, but admit-
tedly with some option for Member States to relax the
provisions. We believe that a more fruitful approach would
be to try to adapt to existing research-related legislation in
Member States with the most developed large-scale epi-
demiology. This legislation appears to have struck a bal-
ance between the citizens’ legitimate wish to preserve their
integrity and public health interests, notably the requisites
for truly valid health-related research, with unspoiled trust
among the public and essentially no examples of important
misbehaviour on the part of the scientific community. We
propose that the following suggestions are forwarded:
1. As pointed out in amendment proposals from the
European Parliament’s Committee on Industry,
Research and Energy and Committee on Legal Affairs,
an exemption from the purpose limitation in Article
5(b), corresponding to the existing exemption in the
current Directive 95/46/EC, should be reintroduced.
2. Article 81.2 should be removed entirely. Then, 81.2a
becomes obsolete.
3. The pseudonymization requirement in Article 83 needs
to be relaxed. Pseudonymized data should be defined
as data where the direct identifier is kept separately
from the other information, and should not be extended
to indirect identification. The need for re-identification
to attain precise linkages, data verification and quality
control must be accommodated.
4. Restore the ‘‘6.2–83 axis’’. Article 6 ought to be
revised so that it becomes clear that 6.2 (establishing
the lawfulness of processing of personal data for the
purposes of historical, statistical or scientific research)
overrules 6.1. Other provisions relevant to scientific
research (exemption from the ‘‘storage minimization
principle’’ in 5e, exemption from the prohibition
against processing of sensitive data in 9.2i, exemption
from the ‘‘right to erasure’’ in 17.3c, and the hopefully
reintroduced exemption from ‘‘purpose limitation’’)
should be moved to Article 83. There, the text must
clearly convey that where exemptions are made,
Article 83 overrules the provisions from which scien-
tific research is being exempted.
Epidemiologists and other researchers throughout Eur-
ope should use their contact networks to put pressure on
their respective governments to act via the Council of the
European Union and on their representatives in the Euro-
pean Parliament so that European public health research is
rescued before it is too late.
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